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For an antitrust insider, it is not easy to object to the new Horizontal Merger Guidelines.1  
They are intended to reflect actual practice at the enforcement agencies, and it appears 
that they do reflect that practice as it has evolved recently.  To voice strong objections, 
one has to set out to be provocative and to deliberately go against modern trends. 
 
At the risk of being viewed as an outsider, I will voice some objections to modern trends 
here.  The new Horizontal Merger Guidelines reflect an effort by the enforcement 
agencies – the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Justice 
Department – to move merger law in a direction that facilitates enforcement efforts.  
Courts have looked to the merger guidelines in recent years as a source of law in merger 
cases.  The 1984 and 1992 guidelines have been mined by courts for useful analytical 
tools in merger cases; however, those guidelines did not significantly alter the balance of 
power between the agencies and the courts.  The new guidelines, in contrast, attempt to 
alter the balance of power in favor of the agencies.2 
 
The new guidelines, if treated by courts as a source of law, would reduce the discretion 
traditionally exercised by courts in defining relevant markets and market power in merger 
cases.  This is an undesirable shift in the balance of power because courts have used the 
market power inquiry stage of merger analysis as a general checkpoint or weigh station 
for evaluating factors relevant to the welfare effects of a merger.  For example, a court’s 
beliefs with respect to the relative costs of false convictions and false acquittals will 
influence its judgment on the market definition issue.  Overall, this is a desirable feature 
of the discretion exercised by courts in merger cases. 
 
In a big-picture sense, there is nothing new in this struggle over the balance of power in 
merger cases.  Antitrust law has been shaped over time by a process of give-and-take 
between the courts and the enforcement agencies.3  The agencies typically pressure the 
courts to adopt standards that facilitate enforcement.  The courts often oblige, for a time, 
until the law reaches a stage where it can no longer be justified on the basis of the rule of 
reason analysis that has been at the core of the antitrust case law.4  When that point is 
reached, courts typically retreat to a framework that provides greater discretion to 
judges.5  This process is likely to replay itself in the context of the new merger 
guidelines. 
 
I. Market Definition and Defining a Violation of Clayton Act Section 7 
 
As the new guidelines make clear, the enforcement agencies will put less emphasis on 
market definition, which is reflective of current practice.  The guidelines offer the 
following statement: 
 
                                                 
1 U.S. Dept. of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010) [hereinafter 
Guidelines], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf.   
2 I am not accusing the enforcement agencies of deliberately setting out to alter the balance of power.  I 
assume they have tried to improve enforcement procedures. 
3 Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution xii-xiv (2003). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
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The Agencies’ analysis need not start with market definition. Some of the 
analytical tools used by the Agencies to assess competitive effects do not rely 
on market definition, although evaluation of competitive alternatives 
available to customers is always necessary at some point in the analysis.  
Evidence of competitive effects can inform market definition, just as market 
definition can be informative regarding competitive effects. For example, 
evidence that a reduction in the number of significant rivals offering a group 
of products causes prices for those products to rise significantly can itself 
establish that those products form a relevant market. Such evidence also may 
more directly predict the competitive effects of a merger, reducing the role of 
inferences from market definition and market shares.  
Where analysis suggests alternative and reasonably plausible candidate 
markets, and where the resulting market shares lead to very different 
inferences regarding competitive effects, it is particularly valuable to examine 
more direct forms of evidence concerning those effects.6 
 
This has been the most controversial part of the new guidelines.  Still, it is not easy to see 
the reason for controversy.  The description of the agency’s approach seems to be entirely 
reasonable, and especially so in light of recent practice. 
 
The famous example of recent practice on the question of market definition is FTC v. 
Staples.7  The FTC challenged the merger of Staples and Office Depot even though the 
two firms, combined, would constitute less than 5 percent of the market in office 
supplies.8  The two firms combined would constitute a much larger share of the 
submarket consisting of office supply superstores.  The FTC focused on the impact of the 
merger in the office supply superstore market, and persuaded the court that this was 
indeed a relevant market for merger analysis.  The FTC’s econometric evidence indicated 
that a merged entity combining Staples and Office Depot would be able to raise price by 
at least 5 percent without facing significant loss of consumers to other sellers of office 
supplies.9 
 
The experience of the FTC in Staples and other recent cases suggests that market 
definition is not, as a practical matter, the most important question in a merger analysis.  
To the enforcement agencies, the important question is whether the merging firms will 
gain sufficient market power to harm consumers through an increase in price.10  If that 
proposition can be demonstrated, then defining a relevant market for antitrust purposes 
would seem to be secondary, and a necessary implication of the pricing evidence. 
 
I think this is a fair description of where the enforcement agencies stand on the role of 
market definition (or power) analysis, and what the new merger guidelines set out to 
                                                 
6 Guidelines, supra note 1, at 7. 
7 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997). 
8 Id. at 1075. 
9 Id. at 1076, 1088. 
10 Equivalently, the firms could maintain the price and degrade the quality of their product. 
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describe in a transparent way.  This position has much to be said for it, given the well 
known difficulties in defining a relevant market for antitrust purposes.11 
 
II. Changing Perspective 
 
It is at this point where one has to step outside of familiar antitrust analysis to raise 
objections to what the new guidelines propose to make formal.  One has to think less 
about the need for rigorous enforcement tools for the agencies and more about the role of 
the courts in interpreting Clayton Act Section 7.  The new guidelines reflect a change in 
statutory interpretation and enforcement philosophy that has occurred gradually,12 but 
should not escape questioning.  Moreover, the new guidelines are likely to run into some 
obstacles in the courts eventually, where judges may be unwilling to cede much of their 
law making function in the area of mergers to the enforcement agencies.13 
 
A. Interpretation and Philosophy of Enforcement 
 
The newly “codified” (in the form of the guidelines) approach of the FTC, brought down 
to simplest terms, implies that a sufficient basis to find a violation of Clayton Act Section 
7 is that the merging firms will gain the market power to impose a significant increase in 
price for their consumers – provided that they are unable to prove the existence of 
countervailing efficiencies that will be passed on to consumers.  It follows that under this 
interpretation of the Clayton Act a merger for the apparent purpose of gaining additional 
pricing power is an unambiguous violation of the law.  Of course, the new guidelines are 
merely codifying enforcement norms that have operated in practice for many years now, 
but the codification entails an appeal to courts to treat these norms as law. 
 
This new standard is different from what Clayton Act Section 7 says: 
 
No person engaged in commerce ... shall acquire ... the whole or any part 
of ... another person engaged also in commerce ... where in any line of 
commerce or in ... any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition 
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a 
monopoly.14 
 
The statute does not say that an acquisition is unlawful if it will lead to an increase in the 
price paid by consumers of the merging entity.  And yet, a simple “price-increase 
standard” is not so fanciful that it should have entirely evaded the thought processes of 
legislators, even in 1914 when the statute was enacted.  The fact that the statutory 
                                                 
11 On those difficulties, see, e.g., Franklin M. Fisher, Diagnosing Monopoly, 19 Quarterly Review of 
Economics and Business 7-33, 1979. 
12 On the evolution of the guidelines, see Carl Shapiro, “The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From 
Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years,” 77 Antitrust Law Journal 701 (2010). 
13 For a sign of the difficulties that might confront the guidelines in court, see City of New York v. Group 
Health Incorporated, 2010 WL 2132246 (S.D.N.Y.), 2010-1 Trade Cases P 77,053.  In the course of 
rejecting the plaintiff’s claim, the court noted that it could find nothing in the prior case law to support a 
market definition based on upward pricing pressure.  
14 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
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standard is comparatively vague suggests that at a substantial percentage of legislators 
intended to give courts flexibility in applying it. 
 
It is well known that the Clayton Act was designed to change the standards courts applied 
to specific antitrust violations.15  It was a reaction to the Supreme Court’s Standard Oil16 
decision,17 which adopted the rule of reason test under the Sherman Act.  The Clayton 
Act was designed to restrict the discretion of courts with respect to the violations 
enumerated in it, by replacing the rule of reason test with an alternative that put greater 
emphasis on lessening of competition or movement toward monopoly.  Still, the 
alternative test stated in the Clayton Act left a fair degree of discretion in the courts to 
interpret and apply it.18  
 
The key early case interpreting Clayton Act Section 7 is the Supreme Court’s Brown 
Shoe decision.19  Brown Shoe is famous for setting out the “incipiency doctrine”,20 which 
created enormous problems in merger law until it was rejected in the Court’s General 
Dynamics21 opinion.22  In addition to the incipiency doctrine, and more important, Brown 
Shoe sets out a truncated rule of reason analysis for horizontal mergers.  The analysis is 
truncated in the sense that it does not explicitly incorporate an efficiency defense, except 
through some narrow defenses referred to as “mitigating factors”.23  Overall, Brown Shoe 
takes the view that horizontal mergers are undesirable to the extent that they remove 
competitive choices from consumers over a substantial period of time. 
 
To be more specific, Brown Shoe sets out a three-part inquiry.  The first is an 
examination of market conditions, such as the level of market concentration, and other 
evidence bearing on the structural and operational intensity of competition.  The second 
is an examination of entry conditions and the trends on concentration.  The third is a set 
of narrow defenses – mitigating factors – that effectively constrain the sorts of efficiency 
defenses that can be admitted into the evidence in a merger case. 
 
Although there is room, to be sure, for interpretive disagreements, there is quite a 
distance between the theory of Section 7 as envisioned in Brown Shoe, and the modern 
enforcement policy stated in the new Horizontal Merger Guidelines.  There is a 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 3, at 39-40. 
16 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
17 Hylton, supra note 3, at 39. 
18 The early cases interpreting Clayton Act Section 7 do not suggest that the FTC’s price-increase test was a 
commonly understood or accepted interpretation of the statute’s language.  The FTC’s interpretation is 
supported in the case law by just a small number of recent decisions.  Of course, one might argue that this 
just reflects the natural evolution of law. 
19 Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
20 A definition of the incipiency doctrine is provided in Hylton, supra note 3, at 319-20 (“… the incipiency 
doctrine, which holds that a horizontal merger may violate Section 7 even though the share of the market 
absorbed is relatively small, because the merger is an indicator of a movement toward concentration”).  See 
also, Shapiro, supra note 12, at 703 (discussing “shocking” approach under one set of arguments advanced 
in early merger cases). 
21 United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). 
22 Hylton, supra note 3, 325-28. 
23 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 346. 
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substantial difference between the traditional approach to the statute, which aims to 
prevent mergers that effectively eliminate or seriously degrade alternatives to consumers, 
and an approach that, in addition to the traditional view, prevents consumers from having 
to pay a higher price resulting from the additional market power created by a merger. 
 
The courts, for the most part, are reading a case law that is based on the older 
interpretation, while the enforcement agencies are coming to court with the modern 
interpretation.  This is consistent with the broader history of antitrust law; enforcement 
agencies have typically pressured courts to adopt interpretations of the antitrust statutes 
that facilitate enforcement. 
  
One might argue that the new interpretation should prevail because it is clearer, in 
addition to giving the agency greater enforcement authority.  Isn’t it obvious that any 
merger that could result in a price increase to consumers as a consequence of additional 
market power is what the statute should aim to prevent?  This is an open question. 
 
One reason why this position is contestable is that it anticipates virtually no role for 
market forces in controlling the pricing power of merging entities.  I mean this in two 
senses.  First, prices will sometimes rise as part of the competitive process.  This is 
implied by the entry and exit process.24  If economic profits are negative in the short run, 
firms will exit, which will cause prices to rise toward the long run competitive 
equilibrium level.  The exits that occur as part of the adjustment toward the long run level 
effectively give surviving firms additional pricing power.25 
 
Sometimes exit occurs by firms just shutting down.  Other times, probably more often in 
reality, weaker (or maladjusted) firms are acquired by healthier (better positioned) firms.  
The mergers that occur as part of the exit process will necessarily lead to higher prices.  
These higher prices will hurt consumers in the short run, but they are part of the process 
of long run competitive adjustment.  Exogenous changes could occur, leading to negative 
economic profits – or entry could overshoot, leading to the same result.  In the short run, 
consumers will enjoy a price level that is too low relative to the long run level. 
 
The exit process is described in basic economics classes as one in which some firms just 
leave the market.  However, when one firm acquires another in the exit process, assets are 
redeployed in an efficient manner.  In the redeployment process observed in the case of a 
merger that operates as a form of exit, the higher quality assets of the exiting firm are 
retained by the acquiring entity, while the lower quality assets of the both the acquiring 
                                                 
24 Incorporating endogenous entry and exit in the merger process alters some of the standard results of the 
static analysis.  See Gautam Gowrisankaran, A Dynamic Model of Endogenous Horizontal Mergers, 30 
RAND Journal of Economics 56-83 (1999); Morton I. Kamien and Isreal Zang, The Limits of 
Monopolization through Acquisition, 105 Quarterly Journal of Economics 465-500 (1990).  The analysis 
underlying the new guidelines is based on static models of the merger process, such as in Joseph Farrell and 
Carl Shapiro, 2001, Scale economies and synergies in horizontal merger analysis, Antitrust Law Journal, 
vol. 68 (3), 685-710. 
25 Consider a simple Cournot model with N firms, each with marginal (and average) cost c, and demand 
curve p = a – bQ (where Q is the total quantity of the firms).  The Cournot equilibrium price is given by p = 
(a + Nc)/(N+1).  As firms exit, each remaining firm effectively gains additional pricing power.  
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and acquired entities are shed.  The merger facilitates an efficient reassignment of assets 
that would otherwise have to take place through a comparatively cumbersome process 
involving market transactions.  This is an implication of Coases’s theory of the firm.26  
To the extent the merger process reduces transaction costs, it reduces the long run costs 
of the industry. 
 
The second sense in which market forces regulate pricing is through entry, which 
regulates price increases.  If too many mergers occur, so that prices rise above the long 
run competitive level, entry occurs until prices are driven back to the long run level.  
Entry can also occur through the merger process, where the acquiring firm chooses to 
enter a new line of business by acquiring a firm already in the market. 
 
When considering the new interpretation of Clayton Act Section 7 by the FTC, one has to 
ask whether it leaves sufficient room for the competitive adjustment process to function.  
If it does not, then the FTC’s enforcement approach can harm consumers in the long run.  
The FTC’s modern interpretation of Section 7 empowers the agency to bring enforcement 
actions which benefit some consumers in the short run only to result in greater long term 
harm. 
 
To illustrate the potential for harm from the FTC’s interpretation, suppose there is a 
short-run equilibrium with firms making negative economic profits.  One firm attempts to 
acquire another, in a merger that will lead to greater pricing power.  The FTC blocks the 
merger.  The weak (maladjusted) firm, unable to be acquired by the stronger firm, 
eventually exits the industry.  In the long run, its assets will be redeployed to some other 
activity.  However, the most efficient process of consolidation has been blocked by the 
FTC.  The likely result is that some resources will depreciate to a larger degree than 
would be observed in an efficient redeployment process.  This, in turn, implies that the 
industry long run costs will be greater and the long run equilibrium price higher.  In 
addition, the transaction costs from the more cumbersome redeployment process also 
feed into greater long run costs.  In the end, society has expended resources in an 
enforcement process that effectively transfers wealth from generations of consumers in 
the steady state (long run) to a specific temporal cohort of consumers in the short run. 
 
Of course, one response to this concern is to say that the enforcement agencies will 
refrain from opposing mergers that do not threaten serious harm to consumers in the long 
run.  Indeed, if the agencies make accurate enforcement decisions, the potential harm just 
described will never be observed.  However, this position assumes that the enforcement 
agencies operate without error, a premise that I take to be false. 
 
This story has nothing to do with the “failing company defense”.27  Firms may be earning 
negative economic profits even when they are thriving if measured on the basis of 
accounting profits.  All that is necessary for the existence of negative economic profits is 
                                                 
26 The Nature of the Firm. R. H. Coase. Economica, New Series, Vol. 4, No. 16. (Nov., 1937), pp. 386-405 
27 For a discussion of the failing company defense, see, e.g., Areeda, Kaplow, Edlin, Antitrust Analysis: 
Problems, Texts, and Cases 708 (Sixth Edition 2004) 
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that the resources used in one activity are more valuable in another activity.  A business 
could be profitable in accounting terms, while unprofitable in economic terms.28 
 
I have assumed in this account that the FTC is accurate in distinguishing mergers for 
pricing power from mergers for efficiency.29  If I assume instead that the FTC sometimes 
errs in making this distinction, the social costs of its enforcement conduct would be 
higher.  Taking error into account would require us to compare false conviction and false 
acquittal costs from the FTC’s merger enforcement decisions.30  
 
The alternative to the FTC’s modern interpretation of Section 7 is the less rigorous 
standard of Brown Shoe.  Under that standard, a merger to gain pricing power might be 
approved under Section 7.  The reason is that a reviewing court might find that 
competition is intense and that entry is relatively easy.  There were facts that would have 
supported such findings even in Staples.  Competition had led stores to exit from the 
office supply superstore market in greater frequency than to enter in the years 
immediately before the merger challenge.31  The evidence of exit is a sign that office 
supply superstores were making negative economic profits at the time of the merger, and 
that the merger may have been part of this exit process.  Under the Brown Shoe standard 
a court could have concluded that the Staples-Office Depot merger was unlikely to 
violate Section 7.32 
 
The benefit of the Brown Shoe standard, relative to the FTC’s standard, is that it gives 
courts the flexibility to permit mergers for the purpose of gaining pricing power in 
settings where the evidence suggests that the ordinary processes and pressures of 
competition are resilient – as in the case where the merger facilitates exit.  Where 
competitive pressures are resilient, not every merger that results in greater pricing power 
will substantially reduce competition or tend toward monopoly.   
                                                 
28 The example considered in the text is consistent with the familiar story of the industry that suffers a 
negative demand shock, or a declining industry.  But it is also consistent with an industry that experiences a 
shock on the supply side which causes some factor of production (e.g., land) to become more valuable in an 
alternative use.  On the declining industry interpretation, see D. Filson and B. Songsamphant , Horizontal 
Mergers and Exit in Declining Industries, Applied Economics Letters 12(2): 129-132 (2005).  For the 
equivalent supply side adjustment, suppose a firm produces with constant returns to scale in the long run.  
A positive supply shock causes it to shift to a short run average cost curve which has a greater minimum 
efficient scale.  The adjustment process will involve firms exiting and the price rising toward the long run 
level, with industry output greater in the long run.  
29 On the other hand, this discussion assumes that the agencies are not perfectly accurate in distinguishing 
mergers which threaten substantial long term harm to consumers from those that do not.  Obviously, if the 
agencies operate with perfect accuracy, none of the criticisms suggested here merit consideration. 
30 One way of assessing the error-cost record of merger enforcement is to use evidence on price effects of 
mergers.  However, even this evidence could be flawed to the extent price increases may be efficient.  On 
using evidence to evaluate the accuracy of agency decisions, see Orley C. Ashenfelter and Daniel S. 
Hosken, The Effect of Mergers on Consumer. Prices: Evidence from Five Selected Case Studies, NBER 
Working Paper, 2008. 
31 Staples, 970 F. Supp. 1066, at 1086-1089. 
32 Of course, the court in Staples, operating within the Brown Shoe framework, found that the merger was 
likely to violate the statute.  However, the Staples court, rather strangely, took the evidence of exit from the 
office supply superstore market as evidence that the entry and exit process did not serve to regulate pricing 
power.  
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Although I have focused on the example of a merger for exit, there are other instances 
where mergers that result in additional pricing power may not be harmful to overall 
welfare, or to consumer welfare in the long run.  Consider, for example, a merger in 
response to monopsony power on the buyer’s side.33  If the merger enables the combined 
entity to push price above the monopsonistic level, social welfare will be enhanced.  
Alternatively, suppose the merger results in a price increase to some subset of consumers 
and price reductions for other consumers, with the net result being a gain in social 
welfare.34  Yet another class of scenarios to consider involves a firm that innovates in its 
product or service and uses the pricing-power merger as a method of appropriating the 
gains from innovation.35  In these scenarios the merger serves as an alternative to some 
form of intellectual property protection, which may not be available, or may be available 
only at great cost. 
 
In implementing the discretionary test of Brown Shoe, courts have traditionally required a 
definition of the relevant market.  In order to determine whether competition appears to 
be structurally or operationally intense, or whether entry is easy, courts first have to 
define a relevant market.  The definition of a relevant market has involved a fact-
intensive inquiry that trades off many concerns, in addition to the strict concern of 
finding a market which could be monopolized by the defendant (through an acquisition or 
through some anticompetitive conduct).  When courts determine a relevant market, they 
are taking into account the consequences of that decision for the competitive process 
itself.  If defining a market too narrowly will lead to the replacement of the market 
process of industrial rationalization with an administrative process, or discourage 
innovation incentives, courts are likely to take those costs into account.  They are aware 
of the possibility that they could err in the decision, and will therefore tend toward a 
market definition that minimizes the costs of errors.36 
 
The FTC’s standard would relegate the market definition component of a merger dispute 
to a lesser status.  In so doing, it would constrain the ability of courts to make the 
tradeoffs that currently go into a market definition finding.37  If courts consistently make 
                                                 
33 Federal Trade Commission v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999). 
34 A merger may have a mixed effect, leading to an increase in the price of one item in one market (or 
submarket), and price reductions in the same or in other items in other markets.  See Joshua D. Wright, 
Comment on the Proposed Update on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Accounting for Out-of-Market 
Efficiencies (August 10, 2010). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 10-38. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656538. 
35 Hylton, Keith N. and Lin, Haizhen, Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, Dynamic Competition, and 
Changing Economic Conditions, 77 Antitrust Law Journal 247, 266-269 (2011). 
36 Id, at 264-265. 
37 One response to this argument is that courts should simply find some other legal peg on which to do their 
general balancing, and leave market definition to the more rigorous definitions provided by the agencies.  
To some extent, this is unavoidable result of having merger cases decided in court.  Courts will choose the 
optimal “legal peg”, from their own perspective, for deciding cases, and the market definition peg has some 
attractive attributes.  It provides a blanket immunity for the defendant, and allows a dispute to be resolved 
at an early phase of the litigation.  A court could deal with its issues about the error cost tradeoffs at some 
other stage of the litigation, such as the damages phase, but that would clearly lead to a greater cost being 
imposed on the defendant.  In other words, the market definition test serves a function akin to that of the 
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the wrong decision in the implicit balancing of error costs that influences the market 
definition finding, the FTC’s approach could be desirable.  But I am aware of no 
evidence to suggest that courts generally make poor decisions under the Brown Shoe 
standard. 
 
B. Drawbacks 
 
The obvious drawback of Brown Shoe is that it does not provide a rigorous or scientific 
approach to enforcement.  There are no econometric tests that would permit the agency to 
provide a definite answer to a court under the Brown Shoe standard, while the price-
increase standard has provided a rigorous tool for the agency.  It may seem unfair to 
criticize the agency after having developed such a tool for enforcement.  In addition, an 
objective test minimizes the likelihood that political influence will drive the agency’s 
decision rather than economic analysis. 
 
The problem with this defense of the price-increase standard is that it provides a test that 
answers a question that is different from the one that courts should be concerned with 
under Section 7.  If rigor alone is a sufficient defense, then the agency could just as well 
adopt other rigorous tests that have less relevance to the economic concerns motivating 
the enactment of Section 7. 
 
One could also argue that the price-increase standard should be sufficient for its purposes, 
which is to present sufficient evidence to justify a preliminary injunction.  If a court 
wishes to apply the Brown Shoe standard, it could still do so in order to resolve the 
dispute if it goes all the way to a court judgment.  In other words, merger law could 
operate with two standards, one applied at the preliminary injunction stage and another 
applied at the court judgment stage. 
 
There are several problems with this argument.  One is that the enforcement agencies 
have benefited from the courts’ tendency to use the guidelines as a source of law.  If the 
guidelines are going to serve as a source of law, then they should provide standards that 
should be applicable to the merits of the merger decision regardless of the forum in which 
they are addressed.  Courts should not adopt one set of substantive standards for 
preliminary injunction decisions and another set of substantive standards for the actual 
application of the statute, which is an error that the D.C. Circuit has committed in its 
Whole Foods decision.38 
 
Another problem with the two-standards argument is that a preliminary injunction is 
essentially a permanent injunction in merger disputes.  In the majority of cases in which 
the preliminary injunction is issued, the parties walk away from the proposed merger.  
Too many things are likely to change between the date of the preliminary injunction and 
the ultimate resolution of the litigation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
duty test in tort law, Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 
1501, 1525 (2006) (comparing the duty and proximate cause tests in tort doctrine). 
38 FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548 F.3d 1028 (DC Cir. 2008). 
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If the law is going to serve as a set of guidelines for courts and for firms to follow, then it 
should be constructed with an eye toward its impact on merger decisions.  Mergers that 
enhance social welfare in the long run should be permitted.  This suggests that it would 
be unwise to defend a particular merger test on the ground that it is especially appropriate 
for the preliminary injunction phase, even if it not appropriate as a standard to assess the 
overall merits of the merger. 
 
Chevron39 provides another set of potential objections to a court’s decision to adhere to 
the Brown Shoe standard in merger analysis.  Chevron instructs courts to defer to an 
agency’s interpretation of the statute it enforces, as long as that interpretation is 
reasonable and consistent with the settled meaning of the statute.  However, Chevron has 
unclear implications in this setting, as in so many cases.  The Supreme Court has issued 
several opinions, from Brown Shoe to General Dynamics, setting out its views of the 
meaning of Clayton Act Section 7.  The Chevron doctrine does not clearly instruct courts 
to defer to the agency in light of this history.  There is a conflicting doctrine, stare decisis, 
which constrains courts from deviating far from the interpretation set out in the Supreme 
Court’s early merger cases. 
 
III. Innovation in the Guidelines 
 
Closely related to the matter of industrial rationalization – more precisely, the allocation 
of assets to their most productive uses – is that of innovation, which the new horizontal 
merger guidelines treat in a one-sided way.  Again, there are sufficient qualifications to 
find support for just about any view on the implications of merger enforcement for 
innovation in the guidelines, but the general thrust is that mergers may be harmful to rival 
(i.e., non-merging) firms that wish to innovate. 
 
Certainly mergers can be harmful to consumer welfare if they reduce incentives to 
innovate.  The line of thought that appears to be missing from the guidelines is 
recognition that the incentive to innovate is a function of the efficiency of future 
industrial rationalization.  If a firm innovates by creating a new product market, it will 
certainly realize that the new market may change over time in a way that requires the exit 
process to function smoothly.  The efficiency of industrial rationalization will, in turn, be 
a function of the ease with which mergers for such purposes will be allowed.  If firms 
expect that such mergers will not be allowed, their expected long run costs will be higher.  
The incentive to innovate will be lower, in turn, and less innovation will occur.  As in the 
industrial rationalization context examined in the previous part, merger enforcement may 
transfer wealth from consumer generations in the steady state to a particular cohort of 
consumers or firms in the short run. 
 
Obviously, there is an optimal level of enforcement in light of innovation concerns.  Too 
little enforcement will permit mergers that reduce innovation incentives to occur; too 
much will chill innovation incentives.  But this proposition fails to incorporate the risks 
and costs of error.  The discouragement of innovation by rivals that has not occurred is a 
particularly difficult thing to prove or to disprove.  Moreover, if the agency seeks to 
                                                 
39 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 11
block mergers on the ground that they may stifle future innovation by rivals, it will not 
lack for complainants, some of whom may be seeking to avoid more vigorous 
competition.  There is an obvious risk of error in connection with claims of rival firm 
innovation forgone as a result of the fear induced by the merging entity. 
 
In settings where the innovation effects are largely speculative, the high risk of error 
suggests that the market should be left to its own devices.  In the ordinary setting where 
innovation is not at stake, merger enforcement can increase long run industry costs, 
harming consumers.  In the setting where innovation is at stake, this risk is still present, 
in addition to the risk that innovation will be chilled. 
 
The error cost arguments here are entirely analogous to the case of predatory pricing, and 
need not be set out in great detail.  Complainants – the market participants who oppose a 
merger – often have incentives that are unaligned with the social interest, and the theories 
of consumer harm are often speculative.  The market imposes a constraint on the cost of 
false acquittals: the entry process.40  However, the costs of false convictions are both 
substantial and not clearly constrained by the market.  That an enforcement agency rather 
than a private plaintiff stands behind the complaint is insufficient to view the merger 
cases in a completely different light. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Overall, the new enforcement guidelines represent an additional step in the ratcheting 
process that expands the enforcement agencies’ scope of authority and minimizes that of 
the courts.  Their success, from the agencies’ perspective, will depend on how well they 
are received by courts.  Some courts may choose to push back, relying on established 
legal doctrines.  From society’s perspective, the ideal path would require some resistance 
by courts.  The Brown Shoe standard suffers from vagueness and appears to constrain 
courts too weakly, but it is probably a better standard for courts to use in reviewing 
merger enforcement decisions than is the FTC’s new guidelines. 
 
                                                 
40 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Texas L. Rev. 1 (1984). 
